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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) and Utah
Const, art. VIII, § 3.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND APPELLATE REVIEW
A.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1.

Did the court correctly find that Plaintiffs had no standing to challenge

Defendants' alleged attorney fee splitting practices?
2.

Did the court correctly hold that Plaintiffs had no standing to challenge

Defendants' alleged improper collection of treble damages, when Plaintiffs never paid
treble damages to Defendants?
B.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Standing is a legal question reviewed for correctness. See Utah Bankers Ass 'n v.
Utah Dep't Fin. Inst., 888 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Aldrich, Nelson, Weight
& Esplin v. Dep't ofEmployment Sec, 878 P.2d 1191, 1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The following statutes and rules are important to this appeal:
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1 (pre and post 1999 versions) (Addendum).

2.

Rules 4-505 and 4-505.01, Utah Rules of Judicial Administration

(Addendum).

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs wrote bad checks that were referred to Defendant Bonneville Billings &
Collections, Inc. ("Bonneville") for collection. Bonneville used its attorney, Defendant
Ted K. Godfrey to collect on the checks. Defendants' strictly complied with Utah statutes
that thoroughly regulate collection efforts. Plaintiffs nonetheless allege twenty-two
separate causes of action that lead to two basic allegations: (1) improper attorney fee
splitting; and (2) improper collection and retention of treble damages.
Defendants moved to dismiss based on Plaintiffs' lack standing. Plaintiffs have
not suffered a distinct and palpable injury giving them a personal stake in the outcome of
this dispute. On June 3, 2002, Judge Frederick granted Defendants' motions. This timely
appeal followed.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
A.

Plaintiff Melanie Lloyd

1.

On April 16, 1999, Plaintiff Melanie A. Lloyd bounced a check to Conoco.

See Complaint at % 27; R. at 6.
2.

The check was referred to Bonneville, which on April 30,1999 sent

statutory notice of the dishonored check to Ms. Lloyd. See Complaint at ^[ 29 and Exhibit
"K";R.at6,55.
3.

On May 18, 1999, a second notice was sent to Ms. Lloyd. See Complaint at

130 and Exhibit "L"; R. at 6, 56. Ms. Lloyd did nothing.
2

4.

On June 13,1999, Mr. Godfrey, on behalf of his client, Bonneville, served

Ms. Lloyd with a summons and complaint. See Complaint at *[ 31 and Exhibit "M"; R. at
6, 58-60.
5.

At this point, Ms. Lloyd sent Defendants a check for $40.20. See

Complaint at \ 32 and Exhibit "N"; R. at 6, 61.
6.

Because suit had already beenfiled,Mr. Godfrey sought another $160.00

($150.00 in attorney's fees and $10.00 for court costs). See Complaint at \ 33; R. at 6.
7.

On June 25,1999, Ms. Lloyd paid the remaining $160.00 and the suit was

dismissed. See Complaint at ^ 34 and Exhibit "O"; R. at 6,62.
8.

To date, Ms. Lloyd has paid a total of $200.20, consisting of the face

amount of the check, a $20.00 service charge, $10.00 in court costs, $150.00 in attorney's
fees and approximately thirty cents in interest. See Complaint atffif32-34 and Exhibits
"N" and "O"; R. at 6, 61-62. Ms. Lloyd did not pay any treble damages, nor were such
damages sought by Defendants.
B.

Plaintiff Linda Haymond

9.

On February 24,2001, Plaintiff Linda Haymond bounced a check to the

Flower Patch for $7.42. See Complaint at \ 9 and Exhibit "A"; R. at 3, 33.
10.

The check was referred to Bonneville, and Bonneville used Mr. Godfrey as

its attorney to collect on the check. See Complaint at <[ffi 11-12; R. at 3.
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11.

On April 13,2001, Mr. Godfrey sent statutory notice of the dishonored

check to Ms. Haymond pursuant to § 7-15-1(5). See Complaint at ^ 13 and Exhibit "B";
R. at 3, 34.
12.

After receiving no response from Ms. Haymond, on June 13,2001, Mr.

Godfrey served Ms. Haymond with a summons and complaint pursuant to § 7-15-1(7).
See Complaint at \ 14 and Exhibit "C"; R. at 3,35-37.
13.

On June 27,2001, Ms. Haymond sent a cashier's check for $28.00 to the

Flower Patch, the merchant that initially received her bad check. See Complaint at \ 15
and Exhibit "D"; R. at 3, 38. By this time, however, $28.00 was insufficient to cover the
amounts owing because of Ms. Haymond's failure to act in a timely manner.
14.

Ms. Haymond retained attorney Lester A. Perry to defend her in the

collection action. See Complaint at % 17; R. at 3.
15.

In August and September of 2001, Mr. Perry sent two letters to Mr. Godfrey

requesting various documents. In those letters, Mr. Perry also alleged that Mr. Godfrey
split fees with Bonneville, and collected statutory damages that were prohibited by Utah's
Dishonored Instruments Act. See Complaint atffi[20-21 and Exhibits "E" and "F"; R. at
4-5,39-41.
16.

On October 2, 2001, Mr. Perry filed formal discovery requests. See

Complaint at \ 23 and Exhibit "H"; R. at 5,44-48.
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17.

Bonneville moved to dismiss the case against Ms. Haymond, and the court

did so over Ms. Haymond's objection. See Complaint atffi[25-26 and Exhibits "I" and
"J"; R. at 5,49-54.
18.

Ms. Haymond only paid Bonneville $28.00, representing the face amount of

the check and a twenty dollar service charge. See Complaint at \ 15 and Exhibit "D"; R.
at 3,38. Ms. Haymond did not pay any attorney's fees or treble damages.
LITIGATION BACKGROUND
For years Plaintiffs attorney, Lester Perry, has been challenging the practices of
collection agencies.1 He has had some success. Ditty v. Check Rite, 182 F.R.D. 639 (D.
Utah 1998) (class action claim that a collection letter violated the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act settled after Judge Tena Campbell certified the class). Mr. Perry has
challenged alleged fee splitting between collection agencies and their lawyers in federal
and state courts, before the state legislature, and before the Utah State Bar. Despite such
close scrutiny, Bonneville and its attorney's actions have not been found to violate the
law. This lawsuit is another example of counsel's crusade against collection agencies.

l

Plaintiffs acknowledge this is their brief by stating that "counsel for Ms.
Haymond and Ms. Lloyd has fought the attorney fee splitting issue against Bonneville
and its attorneys in prior cases." Plaintiffs' Br. at 15 n. 1. See also Riddle v. Perry, 2002
UT 10, Tf 4,40 P.3d 1128 ("Mr. Perry is an attorney who represents plaintiffs in class
action suits against attorneys who practice in the field of debt collection.").
5

The fatal flaw in this effort is that his clients have no standing to challenge such practices
because they have suffered no injury.2
A.

Pickering, et al v. Bonneville Billing and Collections, Inc.y 95-CV-125-B

In 1995, Mr. Perry represented a plaintiff who sued Bonneville and its lawyer in
federal court, alleging that Bonneville improperly split fees with its lawyers. On the
standing issue, Judge Benson wrote:
The consumer plaintiffs' obligation to pay the statutory attorney fees in
Rule 4-505.01 arises from the participation of attorneys in the collection
case, not from the proper allocation of fees after the judgment has been
paid. Only if attorneys were not actually involved in some material manner
in the collection cases do the consumer plaintiffs have a claim based on
their payment of attorney fees. Accordingly, if during discovery the facts
demonstrate that there was more than a token or de minimus attorney
involvement in Bonneville's collection efforts then the Plaintiffs may not
have a cognizable injury at law, and the court would entertain a summary
judgment motion to dismiss on this ground.
Memorandum Opinion and Order, dated October 9,1996, at 5 {See Memorandum in
Support of Defendant Ted K. Godfrey's Motion to Dismiss at Exhibit "1"; R. at 245252).3 Judge Benson also stated that even "[i]f the Plaintiffs do not have a viable cause of
2

In the following sections, Mr. Godfrey refers the Court to two unpublished
decisions and to a letter from the Utah State Bar. They demonstrate that Plaintiffs'
counsel has taken this crusade against collection agencies to every available forum prior
to coming to state court. Also, the Pickering and Heard decisions are factually identical
to the case at hand, they were brought by the same attorney as the present case, they
contain the same arguments involving alleged fee splitting, and they recognize the rule of
law - that Plaintiffs lack standing to assert such claims.
3

Rather than appending a copy of the unpublished decisions cited by Mr. Godfrey
in the Addendum to his Brief, Mr. Godfrey will refer the Court to his Memorandum in
6

action based on their lack of injury, an equitable outcome may still occur. In oral
argument plaintiffs' counsel stated that the Utah State Bar and the Department of
Consumer Protection have pursued this problem against Bonneville and the attorneys
involved. These agencies appear to be the proper means of enforcement in this case of
misused or misallocated attorney fees" Id. at 5 n. 3 (emphasis added). The Pickering
case settled before trial and no class was ever certified. Plaintiffs' counsel carried these
issues over into the Heard case.
B.

Heard v. Bonneville Billing and Collections, Inc. et al, 2:97-CV-445C

The next spring, another plaintiff represented by Mr. Perry sued Bonneville again
in federal court, again alleging unlawful fee splitting. Judge Tena Campbell granted
Bonneville's motion to dismiss for lack of standing:
Even assuming that Bonneville's attorneys were improperly splitting fees
with their client, plaintiff does not have standing to challenge this practice.
* * *

Here, plaintiff has suffered no injury from Bonneville's alleged fee splitting
practice that could be redressed by a favorable decision. Plaintiff does not
allege that the amount of attorney's fees collected from her by defendants
was excessive. In fact, it is undisputed that Bonneville's attorney's collected
the amount of attorney's fees authorized by rule 4-505.01 of the Code of
Judicial Administration. Plaintiffs claim relates only to the later
distribution of the fees collected by Bonneville's attorneys. Because
plaintiff has suffered no concrete, particularized injury from defendants'
Support of Defendant Ted K. Godfrey's Motion to Dismiss. Each of the decisions was
attached as an exhibit to that memorandum and, therefore, are included in the appellate
record.
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distribution of fees, she lacks standing to bring a claim based on
Bonneville's allegedfee splitting practice.
Order of November 30,1998, at 5-6 (emphasis added) (see Memorandum in Support of
Defendant Ted K. Godfrey's Motion to Dismiss at Exhibit "2"; R. at 253-264). Judge
Campbell added: "[i]f plaintiff suspects defendants are engaging in illegal fee splitting,
the proper course of action would be to file a complaint with the Utah State Bar
Association in hopes of initiating a disciplinary proceeding." Id. at 6 n. 3.
Ms. Heard appealed Judge Campbell's decision, and the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the dismissal: "What Bonneville's attorney did with the statutory fees
may violate state ethical rules. How that injures plaintiff, however, eludes us. It is the
fundamental deficiency of Ms. Heard's stake in the outcome of the fee splitting issue
which defeats her standing." Heard v. Bonneville Billing and Collections, 216 F.3d 1087
(table), 2000 WL 825721 at *5 (10th Cir. 2000) (see Memorandum in Support of
Defendant Ted K. Godfrey's Motion to Dismiss at Exhibit "3"; R. at 265-269).
C.

The Utah State Legislature

Plaintiffs' counsel has also taken this issue to the Utah State Legislature. Mr.
Perry testified before the Business, Labor and Economic Development Committee about
amending Utah's "civil check law." See Riddle v. Perry, 2002 UT 10, ^ 4,40 P.3d 1128.

8

D.

The Utah State Bar

On July 6, 2002, Mr. Perry filed a lengthy complaint with the Utah State Bar
alleging that Mr. Godfrey improperly split fees with Bonneville. See Memorandum in
Support of Defendant Ted K. Godfrey's Motion to Dismiss at Exhibit "5"; R. at 278-299.
In the complaint, Mr. Perry alleged that Mr. Godfrey violated the Dishonored Instruments
Act, Rules 4-505 and 4-505.01 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Rules 1.5
and 5.4 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, and Ethics Advisory Opinion No. 100.
Despite Mr. Perry's accusations, the Bar's Office of Professional Conduct dismissed the
complaint:
You have alleged that Mr Godfrey and Bonneville have a fee splitting
arrangement by Mr. Godfrey making excessive payments for the use of the
CUBS system when the attorneys were not previously billed for the use of
this system. Mr. Godfrey stated that he does not engage in any fee splitting
with Bonneville and that Bonneville is paid for the lease, equipment,
insurance, and use of the CUBS system. The evidence is insufficient to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Godfrey has violate
the Rules of Professional Conduct. You have not established that Mr.
Godfrey is fee splitting because of the large payments to Bonneville for use
of the CUBS system. Bonneville is not prohibited from charging its
attorneys more than its cost for the use of its system. Accordingly this
matter is dismissed.
(Letter from Renee Spooner to Lester M. Perry, May 18,2001 (emphasis added) {see
Memorandum in Support of Defendant Ted K. Godfrey's Motion to Dismiss at Exhibit
"6"; R. at 300-302). Mr. Perry attempted to appeal the dismissal of his complaint but his
appeal was untimely.

9

E.

State Court

Plaintiffs now bring the same attack to state court. The forum and the plaintiffs
may be different, but they press the same failed claims. They fare no better here. Judge
Frederick ruled that Plaintiffs lack standing to assert these claims. Plaintiffs now appeal
Judge Frederick's Order of Dismissal.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
To prove standing under Utah law, a plaintiff must show he has suffered a distinct
and palpable injury giving rise to a personal stake in the outcome of the dispute. In rare
instances, courts find standing without injury if plaintiff is the most appropriate plaintiff
to bring the claims. In still rarer settings, courts will find standing without injury if
plaintiff raises issues of such public importance that they ought to be decided to further
public interest.
Regarding the alleged fee splitting claims, Plaintiffs suffered no distinct and
palpable injury because Mr. Godfrey was authorized by statute to collect reasonable
attorney's fees, and the amounts sought were not unreasonable or excessive. Moreover,
even if Mr. Godfrey split fees with Bonneville, Plaintiffs have no interest in the fees once
they are paid. In sum, what happens to fees after they are lawfully collected is none of
Plaintiffs' business.
Similarly, Plaintiffs lack standing to assert their treble damages claims. Neither of
the Plaintiffs paid Bonneville treble damages. They were not soughtfromMs. Lloyd, and
10

although sought, were never collected from Ms. Haymond. Furthermore, Mr. Godfrey
was authorized by statute to seek treble damages from Ms. Haymond. Plaintiffs,
therefore, suffered no distinct and palpable injury regarding treble damages.
Likewise, Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the alternate tests for standing under Utah law.
Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd clearly are not the most appropriate plaintiffs to bring these
claims, and these are not issues of sufficient public importance in and of themselves to
warrant standing. Therefore, this Court should affirm Judge Frederick's Order of
Dismissal.
ARGUMENT
I.

STANDING REQUIREMENTS LIMIT THE POWER OF A COURT TO
HEAR A CASE.
A.

State Common Law

The United States Supreme Court has held that "standing principles are founded in
concern about the proper - and properly limited - role of the courts in a democratic
society." National Credit Union Admin, v. Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479 (1998)
(citations omitted). Standing "operates as a gatekeeper to the courthouse, allowing only
those cases that are fit for judicial resolution." Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin v.
D.E.S., 878 P.2d 1191, 1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Utah Bankers Ass 'n v. Utah Dep 7 of
Fin. Inst., 888 P.2d 714, 717 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Standing . . . is designed to preserve the integrity ofjudicial adjudication by
requiring that legal issues be adequately defined and crystalized so that
11

judicial procedures focus on specific well defined legal and factual issues.
To that end the parties must have both a sufficient interest in the subject
matter of the dispute and a sufficient adverseness so that the issues can be
properly explored.
Nafl Parks & Conservation Ass 'n v. Bd. ofState Lands, 869 P.2d 909,913 (Utah 1993).
Standing preserves the integrity of our legal system by ensuring that only those cases fit
for judicial resolution come before the courts. Grievances better addressed by other
branches of the government do not satisfy the standing requirements.
Standing can be shown if a plaintiff "show[s] some distinct and palpable injury
giving rise to a personal stake in the outcome of the dispute." Order ofPolice Lodge v.
Nordfelt, 869 P.2d 948, 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Nat Parks, 869 P.2d at 913. "One
who is not adversely affected has no standing. A mere allegation of an adverse impact is
not sufficient. There must also be some causal relationship alleged between the injury to
the [complainant], the [defendants'] actions and the relief requested." State v. Mace, 921
P.2d 1372, 1379 (Utah 1996). This is the traditional test for standing.
Utah law provides two alternate tests for standing.4 In rare instances, standing may
be found if there is "no other party who has a greater interest in the outcome of the case
than the aggrieved party and if the issue is unlikely to be raised at all if standing is
denied." Aldrich, 878 P.2d at 1194. Accord Nordfelt, 869 P.2d at 951; Nat. Parks, 869

4

Plaintiffs fail to address the applicability of the two alternate tests for standing
because they believe that "the 'traditional' test of a particularized, palpable injury has
been met." Plaintiffs' Br. at 30-31 n. 11.
12

P.2d at 913. In rarer instances, standing may be found "if the issues presented are unique
and of such importance that they ought to be decided in the furtherance of public
interest." Nordfelt, 869 P.2d at 951-52. Accord Aldrich, 878 P.2d at 1194; Nat'I Parks,
869 P.2d at 913. Plaintiffs satisfy none of these tests.
B.

The Utah Constitution

Although Utah courts have recognized three tests for standing, only the traditional
testfindsany support in the Utah constitution. The second two enjoy no constitutional
underpinnings. The open courts provision of the Utah Constitution defines who shall
have access to courts:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law,
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
Utah Const, art. I, § 11 (emphasis added). Parties who meet this requirement are
guaranteed the "right and opportunity, in a judicial tribunal, to litigate a claim, seek relief,
or defend one's rights." Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, \ 38, 44 P.3d 663.
Courts should be very reluctant to grant standing when the plaintiffs have suffered no
direct injury giving them a personal stake in the outcome of the dispute.
[D]espite our recognition of this Court's power to grant standing where
matters of great public interest and societal impact are concerned, this Court
will not readily relieve a plaintiff of the statutory requirement of showing a
real and personal interest in the dispute.

13

Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145,1150 (Utah 1983). Thus, Plaintiffs must show they have
suffered a "distinct and palpable injury giving rise to a personal stake in the outcome of
the dispute." Nordfelt, 869 P.2d at 950. They cannot meet this burden.
II.

PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FAIL FOR LACK OF STANDING.
A.

Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey Complied with the Dishonored
Instruments Act.

Our economic system relies upon the mutual understanding that when a person
issues a check, there are sufficient funds to cover the check, and the merchant who
receives the check will be paid in full. If there was a guessing game between the issuer
and the merchant every time a check was presented, then merchants would not accept
checks. A check is a promise and covenant that the issuer's account contains sufficient
funds to honor the check. When a person bounces a check, this covenant still needs to be
enforced. However, collecting money costs money. It is only fair that the person who
breaches the covenant pay for the costs. That is the purpose of the Dishonored
Instruments Act. It reflects the importance of this covenant to the economy, and it
thoroughly regulates how those checks are to be collected.
The Dishonored Instruments Act, Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1, authorizes the holder
of a dishonored check to take specific actions to collect what is owed. The Act "provides
for an escalation of recoverable amounts as time elapses without payment of the
dishonored check and as additional steps are taken to recover the check amount."
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Checkrite Recovery Serv. v. King, 2002 UT 76, ^ 5, 52 P.3d 1265. Initially, the issuer of
a dishonored check is liable for the check amount and a "service charge" of $20.00. Utah
Code Ann. § 7-15-l(2)(b). Before a holder may charge "collection costs" or file suit, it
must mail statutory "written notice" to the issuer, under § 7-15-l(5)(b). If the issuer does
not pay the check amount and the service charge of $20.00 within fifteen daysfromwhen
the notice was mailed, the holder is authorized to collect the check amount, the service
charge of $20.00 and "collection costs" not to exceed $20.00. Id. § 7-15-1(4).
If the issuer does not pay these amounts within thirty daysfromwhen the notice
was mailed, the holder has two options. First, the holder may offer not to file a lawsuit if
the issuer pays the holder the check amount, a service charge of $20.00, collection costs
not to exceed $20.00, treble damages, and reasonable attorney's fees not to exceed $50.00
(if the holder retains an attorney). See id. § 7-15-l(6)(a). Second, if a lawsuit is filed
then the issuer is liable to the holder for the check amount, interest, costs of collection,
including all court costs and reasonable attorneys fees, and treble damages. See id.
§ 7-15-l(7)(b). The statute specifically states the amount of treble damages which the
holder is authorized to collect. See id. § 7-15-l(6)(a)(iii) and (7)(b)(iv). Although the
holder is authorized to collect treble damages, the statute requires that all such damages
"be paid to and be the property of the original payee of the check." Id. § 7-15-l(6)(b) and
(7)(d). Bonneville is the holder of the checks it is assigned to collect. Both Bonneville
and its attorney, Mr. Godfrey, complied with the Dishonored Instruments Act.
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B.

Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Assert Their Claims Alleging Attorney Fee
Splitting on Behalf of Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey.
1.

Plaintiffs have suffered no distinct and palpable injury.

Plaintiffs claim to have suffered a "distinct and palpable injury giving rise to a
personal stake in the outcome of the dispute." Order of Police Lodge v. Nordfelt, 869
P.2d 948,950 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Plaintiffs allege that:
Ms. Lloyd paid $150.00 to $160.00 in attorney's fees that were split with
Bonneville . . . [and] Ms. Haymond had to hire an attorney to defend her in
Bonneville's collection action and keep Bonneville and its attorney from
collecting the bogus attorney's fees.
Plaintiffs' Br. at 30. Plaintiffs have suffered no injury.
Bonneville complied with applicable law and sought only statutory attorney's fees
from Plaintiffs. Both versions of Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1 that were in effect when Ms.
Lloyd and Ms. Haymond wrote their respective checks allowed the "holder" to collect
"court costs and reasonable attorney's fees." See Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1.5 A "holder"
is "[a] person who has legal possession of a negotiable instrument and is entitled to
receive payment on it." Black's Law Dictionary 737 (7th ed. 1999). Bonneville had legal
possession of both checks and was entitled to receive payment on them. Thus, Bonneville

Subsection (4) of § 7-15-1 of the 1997 amendments in effect on April 16,1999
when Ms. Lloyd wrote her check, allowed the holder to collect "reasonable attorney's
fees" (Addendum). Subsection (7) of § 7-15-1 of the 1999 amendments, in effect on
February 24,2001 when Ms. Haymond wrote her check, also allowed the holder to
collect "reasonable attorney's fees" (Addendum).
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was a "holder" entitled to collect reasonable attorney's fees under Utah Code Ann.
§7-15-1.
The fees sought by Bonneville were reasonable. On Bonneville's behalf, Mr.
Godfrey sought $150.00 in attorney's fees from both Plaintiffs once hefiledsuit.6 This is
the amount that Rule 4-505.01 of the Rules of Judicial Administration allows in a default
judgment of less than $700.00. Plaintiffs can suffer no injury when Bonneville sought
only statutory fees authorized by law.
As Judge Benson put it in Pickering:
The consumer plaintiffs' obligation to pay the statutory attorney fees in
Rule 4-505.01 arises from the participation of attorneys in the collection
case, not from the proper allocation of fees after the judgment has been
paid. Only if attorneys were not actually involved in some material manner
in the collection cases do the consumer plaintiffs have a claim based on
their payment of attorney fees. Accordingly, if... the facts demonstrate
that there was more than a token or de minimus attorney involvement in
Bonneville's collection efforts then the Plaintiffs may not have a cognizable
injury at law...
Memorandum Opinion and Order, October 9,1996, at 5 {see Memorandum in Support of
Defendant Ted K. Godfrey's Motion to Dismiss at Exhibit "1"; R. at 245-252). Here, Mr.
Godfrey followed the statutory collection steps to the letter, and requested only the

6

Plaintiffs allege in their Complaint that Bonneville "collected up to $160.00" in
attorney's fees from Ms. Lloyd. See Complaint at \ 71; R. at 15. However, that amount
actually represents $150.00 in attorney's fees and $10.00 in court costs for the cost of
serving Ms. Lloyd.
17

statutory sum. If Plaintiffs suffered some injury, it is not legally cognizable, for the law
requires the very steps that Mr. Godfrey followed.
Judge Campbell's order in the Heard case similarly noted that requesting
statutorily authorized attorney's fees does not result in an injury:
Even assuming that Bonneville's attorney's were improperly splitting fees
with their client, plaintiff does not have standing to challenge this practice.
He *

*

Here, plaintiff has suffered no injury from Bonneville's alleged fee splitting
practice that could be redressed by a favorable decision. Plaintiff does not
allege that the amount of attorney's fees collected from her by defendants
was excessive. In fact, it is undisputed that Bonneville's attorney's
collected the amount of attorney's fees authorized by rule 4-505.01 of the
Code of Judicial Administration. Plaintiffs claim relates only to the later
distribution of the fees collected by Bonneville's attorneys. Because
plaintiff has suffered no concrete, particularized injury from defendants'
distribution of fees, she lacks standing to bring a claim based on
Bonneville's alleged fee splitting practice.
Campbell Order of November 30, 1998, at 5-6 {see Memorandum in Support of
Defendant Ted K. Godfrey's Motion to Dismiss at Exhibit "2"; R. at 253-264). Finally,
the Tenth Circuit rejected identical claims in the Heard decision. "What Bonneville's
attorney did with the statutory fees may violate state ethical rules. How that injures
plaintiff, however, eludes us. It is the fundamental deficiency of Ms. Heard's stake in the
outcome of the fee splitting issue which defeats her standing." Heard v. Bonneville
Billing and Collections, 216 F.3d 1087 (table), 2000 WL 825721 at *5 (10th Cir. 2000)
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(see Memorandum in Support of Defendant Ted K. Godfrey's Motion to Dismiss at
Exhibit "3"; R. at 265-269).
Plaintiffs rely on Fuller v. Medical Collections, Inc., 891 P.2d 300 (Haw. Ct. App
1995), for the proposition that money collected by an agency from a debtor as an
attorney's fee is not an attorney's fee if it is not paid to the attorney. See id., at 316.
Fuller is not binding on this Court. Nor is it persuasive, because it is materially different
from this case. In Fuller, the appellate court vacated an order granting defendant's
motion to dismiss. The Hawaii statute which governed collection agencies in Fuller
provided a private cause of action to any consumer injured by a collection agency's
unlawful acts:
While HRS § 443B-2 (Supp. 1992) does delegate enforcement of the chapter
to the director, enforcement may also be had through HRS chapter 480
(1985 and Supp.1992). HRS § 443B-20 (Supp. 1992) states that, "A
violation of this chapter by a collection agency shall constitute unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce for the purpose of Section 480-2." HRS §
480-2(d) (Supp. 1992), in turn, permits suit on any unfair and deceptive
trade practice to be brought by a uconsumer." HRS § 480-13(b) allows
"fajny consumer who is injured by any unfair or deceptive act or practice
forbidden or declared unlawful by Section 480-2 " to sue for damages. The
complaints, thus, pray for relief under HRS § 480-13(b) (Supp. 1992) based
on violations of HRS chapter 443B.
Id. at 305 (emphasis added). The Hawaii court went on to hold that if:
the collection agencies collected attorney fees knowing that, pursuant to
contract with their attorney, they would pay their attorney less attorney fees
than they collected, the collection agencies have in fact collected under the
"attorney's fee" label something other than "an attorney's fee or
19

commission[.]" Obtaining a judgment for and collecting that "attorney's
fee" under those circumstances is a seriousfraudupon the court and a
violation ofHRS Chapter 443B, and affords Plaintiffs a cause ofaction
against the collection agencies for the Plaintiffs' resulting damages
Id. at 316 (emphasis added). In stark contrast, Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd rely on the
Utah Dishonored Instruments Act and Rules 4-505 and 4-505.01 to bring their claims,
none of which provide a private cause of action. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1;
Rules 4-505 and 4-505.01 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. Furthermore,
Utah courts will not recognize a "private cause of action based upon state law, absent
some specific direction from the Legislature." Broadbent v. Bd. ofEduc. of Cache
County Sch. Dist, 910 P.2d 1274, 1278 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Therefore, Fuller is
inapplicable. Plaintiffs have not suffered a legally cognizable injury and, therefore, have
no standing. Plaintiffs also fail to satisfy the alternate tests for standing.
2.

Plaintiffs are not the most appropriate plaintiffs to bring these
claims.

Plaintiffs have failed to show that there is "no other party who has a greater
interest in the outcome of the case than the aggrieved party and the issue is unlikely to be
raised at all if standing is denied." Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin v. D.E.S., 878 P.2d
1191,1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). First and foremost, there is no "issue" to raise in this
case. As shown above, Plaintiffs have suffered no injury as a result of Mr. Godfrey
seeking the attorney's fees authorized by statute. Because Mr. Godfrey's actions were
consistent with Utah law, there can be no "appropriate plaintiff to bring this action.
20

Moreover, Ms. Haymond did not pay any attorney's fees to Mr. Godfrey. Therefore, she
clearly fails this test because any party who actually paid attorney's fees would be a more
appropriate plaintiff than Ms. Haymond. Ms. Lloyd, finally, who paid only the statutory
fee, cannot complain they were excessive or unreasonable.
Although Plaintiffs attempt to characterize their fee splitting claims as violations
of the Utah Dishonored Instruments Act, and Rules 4-505 and 4-505.01, in reality their
claims are based upon the alleged violation of Rule 5.4 of the Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct which prohibits attorney fee splitting. Plaintiffs' Br. at 25 n.10; Complaint at ^[
75; R. at 16-17. Violations of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct do not give rise to
a private cause of action. See Archuleta v. Hughes, 969 P.2d 409,413-414 (Utah 1998).
Furthermore, "[violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct are prosecuted by the
Utah State Bar through the Office of Professional Conduct." Pendleton v. Utah State
Bar, 2000 UT 96, \ 9,16 P.3d 1230. Therefore, the Office of Professional Conduct is
also a more appropriate plaintiff to bring these claims, and Plaintiffs, therefore, fail the
first alternate test for standing.
3.

These are not issues of great importance that should be decided
by the Court.

Plaintiffs have failed to show that "the issues presented are unique and of such
importance that they ought to be decided in the furtherance of public interest." Nordfelt,
869 P.2d at 951-52. Once again, Plaintiffs have suffered no injury as a result of Mr.
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Godfrey seeking the attorney's fees authorized by Rule 4-505.01, and Ms. Haymond and
Ms. Lloyd are not the most appropriate plaintiffs to bring these claims. Furthermore,
Plaintiffs' fee splitting claims are not issues that should be decided by any court.
Judge Benson and Judge Campbell have both declined to adjudicate identical
grievances, finding that fee splitting is an attorney disciplinary matter for the Utah State
Bar. Sure enough, Plaintiffs' counsel filed a lengthy complaint against Mr. Godfrey with
the state bar raising these very allegations. Yet, it was dismissed in May of 2001. Still
unsatisfied, Plaintiffs' counsel is trying again in court. Changing courts does change the
disciplinary nature of the grievance. Utah courts "will not entertain generalized
grievances that are more appropriately directed to [other] branches of the state
government." Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Utah 1983). The same rule and
result apply here. Plaintiffs have no standing.
4.

Additionally, Plaintiffs are seeking relief which the Court cannot
grant.

Still another reason why this is not a justiciable controversy is that Plaintiffs seek
relief which the Court cannot grant. Plaintiffs' complaint alleges twenty-two causes of
action and requests class certification. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants obtained
judgments against many class members for "imaginary attorney's fees." See Complaint
at If 77; R. at 17. Plaintiffs have requested that the trial court "enter an order vacating all
such judgments and require Bonneville to record the order in all cases that have such
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judgments entered." See Complaint atffi|77, 82, 88, 90, 94; R. 17-20. Plaintiffs,
however, have not complied with Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the
only available avenue by which to challenge unappealedfinaljudgments. Thus, Plaintiffs
cannot show "a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision."
Faustin v. City and County ofDenver, 268 F.3d 942, 947 (10th Cir. 2001).
In summary, Plaintiffs lack standing to assert their claims alleging attorney fee
splitting by Mr. Godfrey and Bonneville.
C.

Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Assert Their Claims Alleging the Improper
Collection and Retention Treble Damages on Behalf of Bonneville and
Mr. Godfrey.
1.

Plaintiffs have suffered no distinct and palpable injury.

Plaintiffs fail the traditional test for standing because they have not suffered a
"distinct and palpable injury giving rise to a personal stake in the outcome of the dispute."
Order ofPolice Lodge v. Nordfelt, 869 P.2d 948, 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Neither Ms.
Lloyd nor Ms. Haymond paid treble damages to Bonneville. Treble damages were never
requested of Ms. Lloyd and, in fact, were not available when Ms. Lloyd bounced her
check. Therefore, Ms. Lloyd suffered no distinct and palpable injury.
The 1999 amendments to the Dishonored Instruments Act (Addendum), in effect
when Ms. Haymond bounced her check, authorized the check holder to collect triple the
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face amount of the check as treble damages.7 Such damages, however, must be "paid to
and be the property of the original payee of the check." Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-l(6)(b)(i)
and (7)(e)(i). Bonneville, as holder, is authorized to collect treble damages, but may not
"retain amounts charged or collected." They belong to the payee of the check.
In the pre-suit notice and the complaint served upon Ms. Haymond, Bonneville
requested treble damages as authorized by statute. However, Ms. Haymond did not pay
any treble damages to Mr. Godfrey or Bonneville. Plaintiffs allege that "Bonneville and
Mr. Godfrey attempted to collect such damages with the intent of keeping the damages
for themselves." See Complaint at ^f 47; R. at 9. Even if true, Ms. Haymond has suffered
no injury. If any party could allege an injury it would be the original merchant who
received the check, not Ms. Haymond. "One who is not adversely affected has no
standing. A mere allegation of an adverse impact is not sufficient. There must also be
some causal relationship between the injury to the [complainant], the [defendants']
actions and the relief requested." State v. Mace, 921 P.2d 1372, 1379 (Utah 1996).
Ms. Haymond claims that she suffered a distinct and palpable injury because she
had to hire a lawyer to avoid paying treble damages. See Plaintiffs' Br. at 32. However,
to the extent that hiring a lawyer is an injury, it was the direct result of Ms. Haymond's

7

The Act also sets minimum and maximum limits for treble damages. The
minimum amount is $50.00 if no suit isfiled,and $100.00 if a lawsuit is filed. The
maximum amount is $250.00 if no suit isfiled,and $500.00 if a lawsuit is filed. See Utah
Code Ann. §7-15-1(6) and (7).
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own actions. First, Ms. Haymond bounced a check. Second, she failed to pay the check
amount and a minor service charge in a timely manner. Had she done so, treble damages
would not have been an issue. It was only after Ms. Haymond bounced a check, and then
was derelict in correcting the problem, that Bonneville filed suit. Ms. Haymond did not
hire an attorney solely to avoid paying treble damages. She hired Mr. Perry to defend her
in the collection lawsuit. If Ms. Haymond suffered any injury at all, it was self inflicted
and does not confer standing to bring these claims. Therefore, under the traditional test,
Plaintiffs lack standing on the fee splitting claims.
2.

Plaintiffs are not the most appropriate plaintiffs to bring these
claims.

Plaintiffs have failed to show that there is "no other party who has a greater
interest in the outcome of the case than the aggrieved party and the issue is unlikely to be
raised at all if standing is denied." Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin v. D.E.S., 878 P.2d
1191,1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this test, for they have no
"interest in the outcome." Neither Plaintiff paid treble damages. Therefore, anyone who
actually paid treble damages would be a more appropriate plaintiff. Additionally, even if
Bonneville and Mr. Godfrey improperly retained treble damages, the payees of the checks
would be the injured parties and would be the appropriate plaintiffs. "Plaintiffs] may not
allege jeopardy or injury to others in order to confer standing upon [their] own claims."
York v. Unqualified Washington County Elected Officials, 714 P.2d 679, 680 (Utah
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1986). Ms. Haymond and Ms. Lloyd clearly are not the most appropriate plaintiffs to
bring these claims.
3.

These are not issues of great importance that should be decided
in the furtherance of public interest.

Plaintiffs have failed to show that "the issues presented are unique and of such
importance that they ought to be decided in the furtherance of public interest." Order of
Police Lodge v. NordfelU 869 P.2d 948,950 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The treble damages
claims are not of sufficient public importance in and of themselves to warrant standing.
There is nothing in the Complaint to support the argument that these issues need to be
decided and that they need to be decided right now. To the contrary, it was appropriate
for the Judge Frederick to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims and wait to address these issues if
and when they are brought by an appropriate plaintiff who has suffered a distinct and
palpable injury.
In summary, Plaintiffs lack standing to assert their claims alleging the improper
collection and retention of treble damages by Mr. Godfrey and Bonneville.
IIL

JUDGE FREDERICK'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL DID NOT VIOLATE
PLAINTIFFS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court violated Article I, Sections 7 and 11 of the Utah

Constitution by dismissing their claims and denying them their right to a day in court.
See Plaintiffs' Br. at 32-34. This argument, however, is being raised for the first time on
appeal and, therefore, should not be considered by the Court. Furthermore, even if the
26

Court were to consider Plaintiffs' untimely constitutional argument, this argument fails on
the merits because Plaintiffs lack standing.
A.

Plaintiffs' Constitutional Argument is Being Raised for the First Time
on Appeal.

Plaintiffs' constitutional argument, claiming violation of the due process and open
courts provisions, is being raised for the first time on appeal. Plaintiffs failed to raise this
argument in their memoranda filed in opposition to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. See
R. at 322-431. Plaintiffs also failed to raise this argument during the hearing on
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. See Transcript of June 3,2002 Hearing; R. at 479 (pp.
1-14).
This Court has repeatedly held that "[i]ssues not raised at trial cannot be argued for
the first time on appeal." Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996) (citation
omitted); accord Treffv. Hinckley, 2001 UT 50, ] 9 n.4,26 P.3d 212 ("We will not
address any arguments raised for the first time on appeal."); Certified Sur. Group, Ltd. v.
Utah Inc., 960 P.2d 904, 906 n.3 (Utah 1998) ("Issues raised for the first time on appeal
will generally not be considered."). "This rule applies to all claims, including
constitutional questions." Monson, 928 P.2d at 1022. Because Plaintiffs failed to raise
their constitutional argument in the trial court, it should not be considered on appeal. See
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 661 (Utah 1985) ("Failure to raise the point [below]
precludes its consideration here.").
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B.

Plaintiffs' Constitutional Rights were not Violated Because Plaintiffs
Lack Standing to Sue,

Even if the Court considers Plaintiffs' untimely constitutional argument, that
argument fails on the merits because Plaintiffs lack standing to sue. The due process
provision of the Utah Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law." Utah Const, art. I, § 7. The open courts
provision of the Utah Constitution provides:
All courts shall be open, and every person,^ an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law,
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
Utah Const, art. I, § 11 (emphasis added).
The protections provided under due process and open courts provisions are not
triggered unless a plaintiff has standing to sue. This Court recently held that:
[T]he open courts provision guarantees litigants access to the courts, i.e., a
day in court, affording them the opportunity to litigate any justiciable
controversy. However, that right is limited to those individuals who
actually have a viable claim, because the right is inextricably connected
with that claim..
Applied Med. Tech. v. Eames, 2002 UT 18, \ 16,44 P.3d 699; accord Miller v. USAA
Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, ^| 38 ("Parties to a suit... are constitutionally entitled to
litigate any justiciable controversy..."). The requirement that a plaintiff have a viable
claim and a justiciable controversy presupposes that the plaintiff has suffered some
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legally cognizable injury. See Utah Const, art. I, § 11 ("All courts shall be open, and
every person,ybr an injury done to him...); Walston v. Lockhart, 62 S.W.3d 257,258-59
(Tex. Ct. App. 2002) ("The requirement of standing is implicit in t h e . . . open courts
provision, which contemplates access to the courts only for those litigants suffering an
injury."). In summary, implicit in the due process and open courts provisions of the Utah
Constitution is the requirement that the plaintiff have standing to sue.
In the present case, Plaintiffs lack standing to assert their claims. Even assuming
Plaintiffs' allegations are true, they have not suffered a distinct and palpable injury giving
rise to a personal stake in the outcome of the dispute. Because Plaintiffs lack standing,
they cannot claim a violation of the due process and open courts provisions of the Utah
Constitution.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the trial court's Order of Dismissal should be affirmed.
DATED this 6^ day of December, 2002.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Andrew M. hio/se
D. Jason Hawkins
Attorneys for Defendant Ted K. Godfrey
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 7. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
CHAPTER 15. DISHONORED INSTRUMENTS
Copyright (C) 1953-1997 by Michie, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed
Elsevier Properties Inc. All rights reserved.
-15-1

Civil liability of issuer -- Notice of action -- Collection costs.

(1) Any person who makes, draws, signs, or issues any check, draft, order, or
iher instrument upon any depository institution, whether as corporate agent or
zherwise, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or
>rporation any money, merchandise, property, or other thing of value or paying
>r any service, wages, salary, or rent is liable to the holder of the check,
raft, order, or other instrument if:
(a) the check, draft, order, or other instrument:
(i) is not honored upon presentment; and
(ii) is marked "refer to maker"; or
(b) the account upon which the check, draft, order, or other instrument has
en made or drawn:
(i) does not exist;
(ii) has been closed; or
(iii) does not have sufficient funds or sufficient credit for payment in
11 of the check, draft, or other instrument.
(2) (a) The holder of the check, draft, order, or other instrument that has
en dishonored may:
(i) give written or verbal notice of dishonor to the person making,
awing, signing, or issuing the check, draft, order, or other instrument; and
(ii) impose a service charge that may not exceed $20.
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a), a holder of a check, draft, order, or
ier instrument that has been dishonored may not charge the service charge
emitted under Subsection (2)(a) if:
(i) the holder redeposits the check, draft, order, or other instrument; and
(ii) that check, draft, order, or other instrument is honored.
(3) Prior to filing an action based upon this section, the holder of a
shonored check, draft, order, or other instrument shall give the person
:ing, drawing, signing, or issuing the dishonored check, draft, order, or
ler instrument written notice of intent to file civil action, allowing the
rson seven days from the date on which the notice was mailed to tender payment
full, plus the service charge imposed for the dishonored check, draft, order,
other instrument.
4) In a civil action, the person making, drawing, signing, or issuing the
>ck, draft, order, or other instrument is liable to the holder for:
(a) the amount of the check, draft, order, or other instrument;
(b) interest; and
(c) all costs of collection, including all court costs and reasonable
orneys' fees.
5) As used in this section, "costs of collection" includes reasonable
pensation, as approved by the court, for time expended if the collection is
sued personally by the holder and not through an agent.
Copr. (C) West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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ST S 7-151
tory: C. 1953, 7-15-1, enacted by L. 1981, r.h Id, «s 13; 1986, ch. 29, s 1;
8, ch. 52, s 1; 1988, ch. 128, s 1; 1997, rh. M S u 1.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
epeals and Reenactments. -- Laws 1981, ch. 16, s 1 repeals former ss 7-151
5-3 (L. 1969, ch. 240, ss 1, 3; 1977, ch. 15, ss 1, 3; 1979, ch. 92, ss 1,
relating to fraudulent checks. Laws 1981, ch. 16, s 13 enacts present ss 7•1 and 7-15-2., Former s 7-1 5-2 was repealed by Laws 1979, ch. 92, s 3.
anendment Notes. - The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, subdivided
^sections (1) and (2) adding the Subsection (3) designation, redesignated
mer Subsections (3) and (4) as (4) and (5), and added Subsection (2)(b).
Iross-References.

Criminal penalties for issuing bad check, b

"in-h-505,

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

sufficient funds.
Knowledge of liuJdei ,
:ed.
sufficient funds.
Knowledge of holder,
rhere was no fraudulent issuance of a check, and plaintiff was not entitled to
torney fees in an action on the check, where the check was issued to pay on a
st due account, plaintiff accepted it with knowledge that there were
sufficient funds to cover it and agreed to hold it for two weeks before
esenting it to the bank. Howells, Inc. v. Nelson, 565 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1977).
This section requires that the signator of a bad check personally receive
nefits, services, or money transfer or, in the alternative, have actual
owledge that the check is drawn on insufficient funds in order to be held
able. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Payne, 782 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989) .
The trial court committed reversible error in construing this section as
posing strict liability on a corporate employee for signing corporate checks
behalf of her employer in payment for corporate obligations, where employee
d no interest, beneficial or otherwise, in the checking account, the funds in
e account, or in the corporation, had no knowledge or reason to believe that
.e checks in question were drawn on insufficient funds, and functioned merely
i a scribe in executing checks for her employer. Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
>. v. Payne, 782 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989).
Cited in Peterson Plumbing Supply v Bern:>90) .
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Copyright (C) 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc; one of the LEXIS
Publishing companies. All rights reserved.
-15-1
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Definitions --Civil liability of issuer --Notice of action -- Collection

--Exemptions.

(1) As used in this chapter:
(a) "Check" means a payment instrument on a depository institution including
(i) check;
(ii) draft;
(iii) order; or
(iv) other instrument.
(b) "Issuer11 means a person who makes, draws, signs, or issues a check,
tether as corporate agent or otherwise, for the purpose of:
(i) obtaining from any person any money, merchandise, property, or oth€*r
ing of value; or
(ii) paying for any service, wages, salary, or rent.
(c) "Mailed" means the day that a notice is properly deposited in the United
ates mail.
(2) (a) An issuer of a check is liable to the holder of the check if:
(i) the check:
(A) is not honored upon presentment; and
(B) is marked "refer to maker";
(ii) the account upon which the check is made or drawn:
(A) does not exist;
(B) has been closed; or
(C) does not have sufficient funds or sufficient credit for payment in
LI of the check; or
(iii) (A) the check is issued in partial or complete fulfillment of a valid
i legally binding obligation; and
(B) the issuer stops payment on the check with the intent to:
(I) fraudulently defeat a possessory lien; or
(II) otherwise defraud the holder of the check.
(b) If an issuer of a check is liable under Subsection (2)(a)# the issuer is
ible for:
(i) the check amount; and
(ii) a service charge of $20.
[3) (a) The holder of a check that has been dishonored may:
(i) give written or oral notice of dishonor to the issuer of the check; and
(ii) waive all or part of the service charge imposed under Subsection
(b).
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(b), a holder of a check that has been
honored may not collect and the issuer is not liable for the service charge
osed under Subsection (2)(b) if:
(i) the holder redeposits the check; and
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(ii) that check is honored.
4) If the issuer does not pay the amount owed under Subsection (2)(b) within
calendar days from the day on which the notice required under Subsection (5)
mailed, the issuer is liable for:
(a) the amount owed under Subsection (2)
(b) collection costs not to exceed $20.
(5) (a) A holder shall provide written notice to an issuer before:
(i) charging collection costs under Subsection (4) in addition to the
>unt owed under Subsection (2)(b); or
(ii) filing an action based upon this section.
(b) The written notice required under Subsection. !"l"») (a! shall notify the
suer of the dishonored check that:
(i) if the amount owed under Subsection (2)(b) is not paid within 15
Lendar days from the day on which the notice is mailed, the issuer is liable

r:
(A) the amount owed under Subsection (2)(b); and
(B) collection costs under Subsection (4); and
(ii) the holder may file civil action if the issuer does not pay to the
lder the amount owed under Subsection (4) within 30 calendar days from the day
which the notice is mailed.
(6) (a) If the issuer has not paid the holder the amounts owed under
bsection (4) within 30 calendar days from the day on which the notice required
Subsection (5) is mailed, the holder may offer to not file civil action under
is section if the issuer pays the holder:
(i) the amount owed under Subsection (2) (b) ;
(ii) the collection costs under Subsection (4);
(iii) an amount that:
(A) is equal to the greater of:
(I) $50; or
(II) triple the check amount; and
(B) does not exceed the check amount plus $250; and
(iv) if the holder retains an attorney to recover on the dishonored check,
tasonable attorney's fees not to exceed $50.
(b) (i) Notwithstanding Subsection (6)(a), all amounts charged or collected
tder Subsection (6)(a)(iii) shall be paid to and be the property of the
riginal payee of the check.
(ii) A person who is not the original payee may not retain any amounts
larged or collected under Subsection (6)(a)(iii).
(iii) The original payee of a check may not contract for a person to retain
ly amounts charged or collected under Subsection (6)(a)(iii)
(7) (a) A civil action may not be filed under this section unless the issuer
ails to pay the amounts owed under Subsection (4) within 30 calendar days from
le day on which the notice required by Subsection (5) is mailed.
(b) In a civil action, the issuer of the check is liable to the hoJder It. - ;
(i) the check amount;
(ii) interest;
(iii) all costs of collection, including all court costs and reasonable
ttorneys' fees; and
(iv) damages:
(A) equal to the greater of:
(I) $100; or
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(II) triple the check amount; and
(B) not to exceed the check amount plus $500.
(c) If an issuer is held liable under Subsection (7)(b), notwithstanding
ubsection (7)(b), a court may waive all or part of the amounts owed under,
ubsections (7)(b)(ii) through (iv) upon a finding of good cause.
(d) (i) Notwithstanding Subsection (7)(b), all amounts charged or collected
rider Subsection (7) (b) (iv) shall be paid to and be the property of the original
ayee of the check.
(ii) A person who is not the original payee may not retain any amounts
larged or collected under Subsection (7)(b)(iv).
(iii) The original payee of a check may not contract for a person to retain
ly amounts charged or collected under Subsection (7)(b)(iv).
(8) This section may not be construed to prohibit the holder of the check from
seking relief under any other applicable statute or cause of action.
(9) (a) Notwithstanding the other provisions of this section, a holder of a
teck is exempt from this section if:
(i) the holder:
(A) is a depository institution; or
(B) a person that receives a payment on behalf of a depository
stitution;
(ii) the check is a payment on a loan that originated at the depository
stitution that:
(A) is the holder; or
(B) on behalf of which the holder received the payment; and
(iii) the loan contract states a specific service charge for dishonor,
(b) A holder exempt under Subsection (6)(a) may contract with an issuer for
* collection of fees or charges for the dishonor of a check.
story: C. 1953, 7-15-1, enacted by L. 1981, ch. 16, s 13; 1986, ch. 29, s 1;
38, ch. 52, s 1; 1988, ch. 128, s 1; 1997, ch. 245, s 1; 1999, ch. 100, s 1;
)9, ch. 171, s 1.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
lepeals and Reenactments. --Laws 1981, ch. 16, s 1 repeals former ss 7-15-1,
.5-3 (L. 1969, ch. 240, ss 1, 3; 1977, ch. 15, ss 1, 3; 1979, ch. 92, ss 1,
relating to fraudulent checks. Laws 1981, ch. 16, s 13 enacts present ss 7•1 and 7-15-2. Former s 7-15-2 was repealed by Laws 1979, ch. 92, s 3.
jnendment Notes. --The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, subdivided
•sections (1) and (2), adding the Subsection (3) designation; redesignated
itier Subsections (3) and (4) as (4) and (5); substituted »$20fl for "$15M in
•section (2)(a)(ii); added Subsection (2) (b) ; and made stylistic changes,
'he 1999 amendment by ch. 100, effective May 3, 1999, rewrote the section,
he 1999 amendment by ch. 171, effective May 3, 1999, added the last
section, establishing exemptions.
his section is set out as reconciled by the Office of Legislative Research
General Counsel.
ross-References. --Criminal penalties for issuing bad check, s 76-6-505.
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UT R J ADMIN Rule 4-505
Judicial Administration Rule 4-505

1

WESTS UTAH RULES OF COURT
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
PART I. JUDICIAL COUNCIL RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
CHAPTER 4. OPERATION OF THE COURTS
ARTICLE 5. CIVIL PRACTICE
Copr. *' WI'VKL f Innjp 1O
' OH All nfMtn reserved.
Current with amendments received through 9-15-2002.
N ULE 1605 ATTORNEY FEES AFFIDAVITS
Intent. To establish uniform criteria and a uniform format fui nffidavits in support of attorney fees
Applicability. This rule shall govern the award uf attorney Itvs in
Statement of the Rule.
(1) Affidavits in support of an award of attorney fees must be filed with the court and set forth
specifically the legal basis for the award, the nature of the work performed by the attorney, the
number of hours spent to prosecute the claim to judgment, or the time spent in pursuing the matter
to the stage for which attorney fees are claimed, and affirm the reasonableness of the fees for
comparable legal services.
(2) The affidavit must also separately state hours by persons other than attorneys, for time spent,
work completed and hourly rate billed.
(3) If the affidavit is in support of attorney fees for services rendered to a person or entity who has
been assigned an interest in a claim for the purpose of collection or hired by the obligee to collect a
debt, the affidavit shall also state that the attorney is not sharing the fee or any portion thereof in
violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4.
(4) If judgment is being taken by default for a principal sum which it is expected will require
considerable additional work to collect, the following phrase may be included in the judgment after
an award consistent with the time spent to the point of default judgment, to cover additional fees
incurred in pursuit of collection:
"AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THIS JUDGMENT SHALL BE AUGMENTED IN
THE AMOUNT OF REASONABLE COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES EXPENDED IN
COLLECTING SAID JUDGMENT BY EXECUTION OR OTHERWISE AS SHALL BE
ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT."
(5) Attorney fees may be awarded pursuant to this rule or pursuant to Rule 4- 505.1.
[Amended effective November 15,1995.]
Judicial Administration Rule 4-505
UT R J ADMIN Rule 4-506
END OF DOCUMENT
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WESTS UTAH RULES OF COURT
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
PART L JUDICIAL COUNCIL RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
CHAPTER 4. OPERATION OF THE COURTS
ARTICLE 5. CIVIL PRACTICE
Copr. ° West Group 2002. All rights reserved.
Current with amendments received through 9-15-2002.
RULE 4-505.01. AWARDS OF ATTORNEY FEES IN CIVIL DEFAULT JUDGMENTS WITH A
PRINCIPAL AMOUNT OF $5,000 OR LESS.
Intent:
To provide for uniformity in awards of attorney fees in civil default judgments with a principal
damages amount of $5,000 or less.
To provide for notice of the amount of attorney fees that may be awarded in the event of default.
Applicability:
This rule shall govern awards of attorney fees in civil default judgments with a principal damages
amount of $5,000 or less in which the claimant elects to seek an award of attorney fees pursuant to
this rule.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) When reasonable attorney fees are provided for by contract or statute and the claimant elects to
seek an award of attorney fees pursuant to this rule, such fees shall be computed as follows:
Principal Amount of
Damages, Exclusive of Costs
and Interest,Attorney
Between
and:Fees Allowed
$0.00
700.01
900.01
1,000.01
1,500.01
2,000.01
2,500.01
3,000.01
3,500.01
4,000.01
4,500.01

$700.00
900.00
1,000.00
1,500.00
2,000.00
2,500.00
3,000.00
3,500.00
4,000.00
4,500.00
5,000.00

$150.00
175.00
200.00
250.00
325.00
400.00
475.00
550.00
625.00
700.00
775.00

(2) Reference to this rule and the amount of attorney fees allowed pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be
stated with particularity in the body or prayer of the complaint.
(3) When a statute provides the basis for the award of attorney fees, reference to the statutory
authority shall be included in the complaint.
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(4) Clerks may enter civil default judgments which include attorney fees awarded pursuant to this
rule.
(5) Attorney fees awarded pursuant to this rule may be augmented after judgment pursuant to Rule 4505. When the court considers a motion for augmentation of attorney fees awarded pursuant to this
rule, it shall consider the attorney time spent prior to the entzy of judgment, the amount of attorney
fees included in the judgment, and the statements contained in the affidavit supporting the motion for
augmentation.
(6) Prior to entry of a judgment which grants attorney fees pursuant to this rule, any party may move
the court to depart from the fees allowed by paragraph (1) of this rule. Such application shall be made
pursuant to Rule 4- 505.
(7) If a contract or other document provides for an award of attorney fees, an original or copy of the
document shall be made a part of the file before attorney fees may be awarded pursuant to this rule.
(8) No affidavit for attorney fees need be filed in order to receive an award of attorney fees 11 u r SUM nl it i
this rule.
(9) No attorney fees awarded pursuant to this rule, nor portion thereof, may be shared in iolalion of
Rule of Professional Conduct 5.4.
[Amended effective November 15,1995; November 1, 2002.]
Judicial Administration RULE 4-505.01
UTR J ADMIN MILE 4 MIS 01
END OF DOCUMENT
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"•"DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District
JUN f 8 2002

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LINDA HAYMOND and MELANIE A. ]
LLOYD, for themselves and for all others ]1
Similarly situated;
]
Plaintiffs
vs.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

]
]

BONNEVILLE BILLING &
]
COLLECTIONS, INC., a Utah corporation; ;
TED K. GODFREY, DAVID TOLLER;
]>
And JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 10;
]>
Defendants.

Civil No.:
010911607
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

]

Defendant Ted K. Godfrey's Motion to Dismiss and Defendants Bonneville Billing &
Collections, Inc/s and David Toller's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion For
Summary Judgment came regularly for hearing on June 3, 2002 at 9:00 a.m. before the
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick. Plaintiffs were represented by Lester A. Perry, Defendant Ted
K. Godfrey was represented by Andrew M. Morse and Defendants Bonneville Billing &

Collections, In:, and !>/'u! Toller weie icpresented by Rebecca I Hill "The Court liean;'1 "ilr
arguments of counsel and considered the parties' memoranda and material on file, and good cause
appearing therefor,
IT IS ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are
granted. The Court rules that Defendants' arguments as set forth in their Memoranda are well-taken
as Plaintiffs have no standing or basis under Utah law for a right of action against Defendants as
they allege in their Complaint. Plaintiffs' Complaint is dismissed with prejudice and on the merits.
Parties to hen (In >• « wo costs 1 his Ouiei o! Dismissal concerns Plaintiffs1 entire action a/jamst
Defendants and is final for purposes of appeal.
D

.- I B ^ d a v o f

eluM-

, 2002.

BY THE COURT:

J. DennisiFredbrick
Third Dif trict/Court Judge
Approved as to form.

Uesjer A. Perry
HpOLE & KING, L.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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Approved as to form:

Andrew M. Morse
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Ted K. Godfrey

Approved as to form:

Rebecca L. Hill
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.G
Attorneys for Defendants Bonneville
Billing & Collections, Inc. and David Toller
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